Hisham is free, but Yemen's 'disappeared' crisis continues

A Yemeni protester calls for the release of detainees held in a Sanaa prison [AFP].

The words of Martin Luther King, "Free, at last," come into their own, as one Yemen's top social media activists, Hisham al-Omeisy, 38, walks free from a Houthi jail in Sanaa, after five month's detention. 

The Houthis did not officially charge him, or allow him access to a lawyer or to his family. His arrest, however, was likely linked to his job at the US embassy in Sanaa. Hisham's case was so sensitive, that we - his friends - couldn't and still can't reveal much of our conversations with his family in Sanaa, without risking their safety.

Hisham doesn't need an introduction.

If you are on Twitter and following news on Yemen, you almost certainly follow Hisham.

Hisham's case attracted widespread attention from human rights groups, and local and international media, because of the significance of his online activism. He has been one of the few top English-speaking commentators inside the country providing almost daily updates on events in Sanaa for his followers and the #Yemen Twitter audience.

As war-torn Yemen faces a dearth of happy news, the Yemen Twitter community celebrated photos this week of Hisham hugging his children for the first time since his detention in August.

More photo of hisham @omeisy with his children in #Sanaa #Yemen . pic.twitter.com/1JbcThphPz

— Ahmad Algohbary (@AhmadAlgohbary) January 15, 2018

But as we celebrate Hisham's release, it must also serve as a reminder of Yemen's "disappeared crisis"; the thousands of forcibly disappeared young men across the country, who don't enjoy Hisham's high media profile, and whose names and faces we don't hear about.

With some 12,000 arrests and more than 3,000 men forcibly disappeared, mothers, sisters and daughters of these abducted men began showing up in front of the central prison or police stations across major Yemeni cities, searching for their kidnapped sons, fathers, brothers and other male relatives. They started to organise and formed a collective named, "Mothers of Abductees Association".

The Association works as a pressure-group, raising awareness of the missing men, and advocating for their release.

The collective's spokesperson told me in a phone interview that many young men are forcibly disappeared for their political activities, and some for no reason at all.

In many cases, the mothers have no information or access to their imprisoned relatives - only if they are lucky they might receive some information. The imprisoned young men are held in terrible conditions and exposed to severe torture.

Dozens have been killed under torture, or have to endure a lasting disability from their wounds. Some parents even risk assault if they question Houthi authorities. In this incident, a young forcibly disappeared man's father was assaulted and beaten to death in front of the prison when he went searching for his son.

Journalists face disappearance because of their work, as affirmed by the recently freed Yousef Al-Ajlan who was released from a Houthis prison in Sanaa after a year-long detention.

The Committee to Protect Journalists notes that, "if the Houthis were considered a governing authority, Yemen would have the fifth highest number of journalists in jail in the world".

As the Houthis took over the capital, Sanaa in September 2014, and started a crackdown the press, Yousef wanted to avoid trouble, so he quit journalism and took a taxi driver job instead.

Still, in October 2016, armed men kidnapped Yousef as he was in his taxi in front of his house. During his detention, he was severely tortured and threatened with rape, and barred from seeing his family for months.

During this time, Yousef was transferred to several prisons and saw dozens of other detained journalists, accused of the same charges; "working for the enemy (Saudi Arabia) as a journalist". After a year, Yousef was finally freed in November, thanks to a prisoners of war exchange deal between Houthi and anti-Houthi tribes.

The death of Ali Abdullah Saleh and the semi-collapse of his political party, the General Public Congress (GPC) have allowed the Houthis to target many of Saleh's supporters.

My family and friends in Sanaa told me of men being dragged out of cars or public transport at checkpoints, and being interrogated about links to the GPC. Later, they are detained and then vanish. The local press reports Houthi executions and the assassination of Saleh's loyalists.

In Aden, the disappearances crisis is no different from in Sanaa. Mothers and daughters of kidnapped men regularly hold sit-in demonstrations calling for information about their relatives' whereabouts and release.

Hisham's case typifies Yemen's disappearance crisis.

But amid the unspeakable human suffering in Yemen, the disappearances crisis lacks attention, let alone an effective investigation. Locally, the climate of fear is on the rise and international human rights groups lack constant and full access to Yemen.

Nonetheless, increased pressure and domestic and international condemnation are needed until all of Yemen's disappeared people are found, and freed.

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*This article was originally written for and published in The New Arab, today. 

Yemen: 2017 in Review

A displaced woman (Malkah Ahmed Saleh) with her daughters sitting at their
temporary home (camp). (Photo: UNICEF/Moohi Al-Zikri)

*A U.N. official warned days ago that, “Yemen could be the worst humanitarian crisis in 50 years.” As 2018 begins, these words reflect the increasingly deteriorating unspeakable human suffering in Yemen, after the UN had been calling Yemen throughout last year as the largest humanitarian crisis in the world.

The poorest Arab nation with a population of around 25 million has been sent into destitution after nearly four years of war. 2017 has been a year of utter despair in light of countless human rights atrocities committed on multi-fronts; from the Saudi-led coalition to Saleh-Houthis’ forces and the U.S. counter-terrorism military operation, all sharing responsibility for creating unspeakable human suffering in Yemen. However, the killing of Saleh at the end of 2017 marks a historical transition that’s going to drastically change Yemen’s political map for years to come.


Human Suffering


Saleh’s violent death gives a glimpse into the gruesomeness of this war. Both combatants and noncombatant innocent civilians are caught up in the violence. While Houthis’ (and Saleh’s for a certain time, until his death) forces in Taiz continued their indiscriminate shelling or, as described by the UN Human Rights Office, the “unrelenting shelling,” against civilian inhabited areas for about three years, resulting in a terrible death toll, the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes since 2015 did not cease to hit non-military populated areas across many parts of Yemen. In 2017, markets, a migrant boat, a local inhabited hotel, among many other non-military targets were hit. The glaring example last year, however, was the story of the five-year-old Bouthina who survived an attack in August by Saudi-led coalition airstrikes hitting an apartment building in Sana’a, killing all her family.

The Yemen Data Project reveals that since 2015 nearly one-third of Saudi air raids hit non-military sites in Yemen. To rub salt into the wound, 2017, in particular, was when more US strikes hit Yemen than the past four years combined, with 125 strikes, under the U.S. war-on-terror military operations. Another glaring example of that was the U.S. Special forces’ first raid in Yemen’s al-Baydah province under U.S. president, Donald Trump, end of January 2017, killing dozens of women and children.

In parallel, Yemenis face a humanitarian catastrophe as the country's infrastructure is almost totally destroyed and humanitarian operations don’t have full access to some of the hardest hit communities in Yemen, following the Saudi-led coalition imposing a siege, in retaliation to a Houthi-fired missile hitting close to Saudi Arabia’s Riyadh airport in November. Despite progress in Saudis promising to open Houdaidah port and letting Aden port open, the humanitarian situation seems to be only worsening, proven by the UN’s recent announcement of the largest-ever emergency relief allocation - $50 million for UN aid-operations to come forward in 2018. This doesn’t reflect a success but rather an indication of how desperate the humanitarian situation is.

The current number of reported civilian casualties seems illogical given the conflicting reports from the U.N. that are not matching the scale of human suffering on the ground. More than a year ago, a UN official revealed that 10,000 civilians have been killed in Yemen but another recent UN report claimed that only 5,000 civilians have been killed since March 2015. As widespread famine threatens millions of lives, there is a new outbreak of disease, diphtheria, in addition to cholera; that’s probably the worst outbreak the world has ever seen, ripping more than 2,000 lives and reaching one million suspect cases. Also, UNICEF has been reporting since the beginning of 2017 that every 10 minutes a child dies in Yemen. In a situation like this, looking like the apocalypse, reports failed to match the real death toll throughout 2017.

While Yemenis are still counting the dead, the only slight of progress ever made in September 2017 was the establishment of an independent investigation committee by the UN Human Rights Council into the war crimes, thanks to great pressure and advocacy work done by international and local Yemeni Human Rights organizations since 2015. This is significant because campaigning clearly pays off and local and international civil society efforts in Yemen do matter. Nonetheless, the committee is due to begin its work later this year.



Yemen without Saleh


By December 2017, a political earthquake was to hit Yemen. Saleh’s death at the hands of the Houthis marked a violent end for an era and a defining point in Yemen’s political map. As ensuing days warring parties’ military operations intensified, Saleh’s death posed two critical aspects. One is that, whether Saleh genuinely desired to initiate negotiations away from Houthis or him forseeing the deadly path of his alliance with the Houthis, it’s confirmed today that Houthis’ politics are driven by violence.

The other aspect is, in spite of Houthis’ violent politics, Saleh’s absence has created for the first time in the course of Yemen’s nearly four years of war, one single centralized power in the north part of Yemen; that’s in the hands of the Houthis. Now more than ever, there has to be a regional and international political will to face this centralized power, reinvent a political solution and resolve the conflict.

Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen as in 2017 alone, both key international allies to Saudi Arabia; the US and the UK have found Yemen's war to be a lucrative business, profiting massively from the financial rewards of their arms sales to Saudi Arabia. With a tragic optimism, let us hope 2018 would bring the political will to end the Yemen war.

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*This article was first written for and published in Open Democracy, January 8, 2018. 

Is a Political Solution Still Possible in Yemen?

Photo: Tribesmen loyal to the Houthi movement hold their weapons as they attend a gathering to mark 1000 days of the Saudi-led military intervention in the Yemeni conflict, in Sanaa, Yemen December 21, 2017.
REUTERS/Mohamed al-Sayaghi

*The end of Saleh-Houthi alliance marks a new chapter in Yemen’s intractable conflict. Two weeks after Saleh’s death, warring parties intensified their military escalation, increasing an already abominable human cost. Despite Saleh’s legacy of subversive tactics and coercion, his death undermines efforts to resolve the conflict. The Houthis, an irrational movement lacking in political experience, make for a highly emotional and unreliable party at the negotiating table. With the passing of Saleh, the ultimate pragmatist with longstanding political and diplomatic ties both locally and internationally, an opportunity has passed with him. In a post-Saleh Yemen, the question remains: is a political solution still feasible?

The most serious issue with the negotiation effort is its absence for more than a year. Days before his death, Saleh presented himself as a negotiator, expressing his readiness for talks with Saudi Arabia. Had he survived, those talks would have materialized through the UN framework, UNSC resolution 2216, which called on Saleh to change his destabilizing action, facilitate disarmament of the Houthis, and return to the National Dialogue Conference’s outcomes. Since his death, the UN Security Council has not passed an amended resolution in line with the recent developments; it instead had a closed-door meeting on the situation and simply called for de-escalation.

With the apparent lack of urgency in reinventing the political solution, on-the-ground fighting has only escalated and new emerging alliances appear to herald further military escalation. Despite its necessity, discussion about a new political solution to the conflict seems premature. Not only has the increased appetite for military competition undermined the prospects for a negotiated solution, but so does the Saudi-led coalition’s flawed tactical approach that aims to unify Yemen’s local factions against the Houthis.

While neither Saudi nor the Houthi camps can claim military superiority, the Houthis have gained significant military strength over the course of the war. After overtaking Sana’a in September 2014 with Saleh’s support, the Houthis captured valuable material from the disoriented national army. Emboldened by their initial victories, Iranian support, and lust for total control, the Houthis met any dissent with violence. Saleh’s betrayal in their eyes justified his undignified execution—and the subsequent crackdown on anyone allied with him. Local press reports also describe Houthi threats and shelling of dissident and pro-Saleh tribes.

Operating on a winner-take-all mentality, the Houthis’ lack of sophistication and nuance has consequently undermined local tribal diplomacy in resolving domestic conflicts. With little regard for even local negotiations, the chances they might engage with international negotiators in good faith appear unlikely.

On the opposing side, a key member in the Saudi-led coalition has taken advantage of the new normal. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has taken steps to realign itself with an old enemy, the Islah political party (a Yemeni version of the Muslim Brotherhood), in the fight against Houthis. This marriage of convenience comes as a sequel to Saleh’s short-lived marriage of convenience with his old enemy, the Houthis. This latest shift suggests that the Saudi-led coalition aims to unify Saleh’s General People’s Conference (GPC) forces, Yemen President Abdrabbo Mansour Hadi’s forces, the Southern Hirak’s forces, and Islah to counter the Houthis. All these factions, however, hold deep historical animosities towards each other, which threatens the effectiveness of such mobilization.

Such marriages of convenience between Yemen’s different factions have allowed each to survive in a highly volatile political climate. Each party reorders its own interest, depending on the political and military dynamics. If any lesson is to be learned from Saleh’s death, however, it should be the eventual collapse of these loose alliances and their potential to backfire.

Given the current configuration, the conflict in Yemen will not likely end in a formal negotiated settlement through the same existing UN framework born out of the National Dialogue and previous UN resolutions. The nearly four years of civil war and Saudi-led military intervention have exacerbated unresolved animosities between Yemen’s different factions. Saleh had killed the godfather of the Houthi movement, Hussein Bader al-Din al-Houthi, which partly motivated his assassination. Islah is asked today to come to good terms with the remaining GPC forces, despite a desire to retaliate for GPC hostility against the party during Saleh’s alliance with Houthis. Southern forces are asked to be the backbone of the anti-Houthi fighting force but still harbour a separatist streak. Any peace effort that dismisses the growing divisions and historical grievances is doomed to fail. A political solution must prevail eventually, but only if it seriously considers these old and newly born challenges.

While warring parties are reluctant to lay down their weapons, people in Yemen face widespread famine and an unprecedented cholera outbreak. A tougher international approach to finding a political solution in Yemen could nevertheless still help avert even greater tragedy in Yemen. There is both a moral and strategic interest in stabilizing Yemen.

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*This article was first written for and published in The Atlantic Council, January 3, 2018. 

'From tree to cup': A Yemeni entrepreneur's coffee dream is brewing

Hussein Ahmed , CEO of Mocha Hunters, aims to make high-quality Yemeni coffee
and export it to overseas markets (Photo courtesy of Mocha Hunters).

Hussein Ahmed has been CEO of Mocha Hunters in war-ravaged Yemen for over a year. His goal is to make high-quality Yemeni coffee and export it to overseas markets. This sounds like an impossible task considering the Saudi-led coalition's blockade, but Ahmed has already started to sow the seeds of his endeavours.

“I don’t find my passion unusual. Yemeni coffee is Yemen’s national treasure and that should be any Yemeni’s concern: to pursue fostering this plant no matter what it takes.”

Hussein Ahmed fell in love with coffee as a child, when he would visit coffee
farmers with his father (Photo courtesy of Mocha Hunters).

Yemeni beans are regaining popularity as some of the best in the world. The earliest cultivation of coffee was in Yemen, where it was given the Arabic name qahwa, from which the English words coffee and cafe both derive.

In the 1400s, the first coffee shipments began from Mocha port on Yemen’s Red sea coast, which was named after the tasty variety of coffee bean. The port became the centre of the world’s coffee trade. Coffee was especially favoured by the Sufis in Yemen who drank it to help them concentrate and stay alert, even during their rituals.

Yemeni beans are regaining popularity as some of the best in the world (Photo courtesy of Mocha Hunters).

According to Ahmed, the chocolatey bean includes four varieties - udaini, burai, tofahi and dawairi - which grow at a high altitude in a dry climate, tended to by farmers with vast experience who have been cultivating the beans for centuries.

The 37-year-old's journey in developing Yemeni coffee stems from having been immersed in coffee farming since childhood. Ahmed, who was born and brought up in Sanaa, had many relatives and family friends who owned coffee farms around the capital. As a child, his father would usually take him to visit them and that’s when he started to fall in love with coffee.

Yemeni farmers have vast experience in coffee cultivation as they have been doing it for
centuries (Photo courtesy of Mocha Hunters)

In September, Ahmed succeeded in shipping the first season's harvest through Aden airport to Saudi Arabia, and then to the US. At the time, the blockade was partially imposed on entry points in Yemen, while Aden airport was open. In the first shipment, Mocha Hunters sent about two tonnes of coffee to Oakland, California, with one kilo costing about $150. It is unclear if the blockade on Yemen will still be in place when the next shipment is due in March 2018. In the meantime, Ahmed is busy taking care of this season's planting, while preparing for the opening of his first cafe in Sanaa. He has not set a fixed date yet but is hoping things will soon calm down in the city.

On 4 December, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed in a roadside gunfight in the capital Sanaa, after switching sides in the civil war. Ahmed says that this has not affected his business. He explains that the state of war and not the death of one political leader is what is affecting most Yemenis, including him.

Earlier last month, the Saudi-led coalition completely blocked ports and airports after Saudi Arabia intercepted a missile fired from Yemen towards its capital Riyadh. The blockade was eased after three weeks, but this had little affect as Yemenis continue to suffer from food, fuel and medicine shortages amid a cholera outbreak, in a country which depends mostly on imports. A de facto blockade has been imposed around Yemeni waters since 2015 by forces belonging to the Saudi led-coalition.

“The blockade did not only make it difficult for us to ship our products abroad, but it has also made production expenses extremely costly,” Ahmed tells Middle East Eye. “With extreme shortages, the fuel we need for farming, watering and transporting is very costly, but we are determined to forge on.”

The Saudi-led blockade on Yemen made shipping products abroad difficult and
made production expenses very costly (Photo courtesy of Mocha Hunters)

As a result of the naval blockade, the country is still struggling with fuel shortages, causing prices to almost double. "The main hurdle we faced was the aerial and naval blockade imposed on Yemen which leads to having high costs to run the farms, and extremely difficult and costly ways to export our products abroad,” Ahmed explains.

A 2016 report from Yemen’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation shows that the war has led to the closure of 95 percent of private companies across Yemen because of a loss of clients, lack of fuel, state insecurity, destruction and increasingly high costs.

Mocha Hunters works closely with about 20 Yemeni farmers (Photo courtesy of Mocha Hunters)

Yet Mocha Hunters was still determined to work closely with about 20 farmers, planting, processing, harvesting, and roasting coffee, or as Ahmed describes it, “from tree to cup”. "It was important for me to have the names of each farmer we worked with printed on the packets of the sold coffee goods." 

In 1997, Ahmed went to the UK as a foreign exchange high school student. He attended English language courses and a vocational training school where he learned software development. While there, Ahmed's interest in coffee grew. 

One kilo of Mocha Hunters coffee costs about $150 dollars (Photo courtesy of Mocha Hunters)

“In the UK, my friends and I used to have our favourite cafe which we never called a cafe but rather 'our temple'," he recalls, laughing. "The cafe [was] our daily meeting point, having Yemeni, Brazilian and other types of coffee every day. We didn’t let any day go by without coffee.”


In 2001, Ahmed met his now ex-wife who is of Japanese descent in the UK. She encouraged him to visit Japan and opened his eyes to how the country was one of the world’s top importers of green coffee. This inspired him to act as a bridge between Japan and Yemen.

While living between Japan and Yemen, he began meeting Yemeni coffee farmers regularly and learning all about pure Yemeni coffee. In 2009, he became an independent coffee wholesaler and opened a coffee shop in Yemen, eyeing Japan as his main market.

In 2009, Ahmed and his wife moved to Japan. By 2011, Ahmed opened his first cafe in Tokyo called Mocha Coffee, serving only Yemeni coffee. It was full of customers and attracted media attention.

Ahmed attributes the success of his cafe to the appreciation that the Japanese have for quality and the personal touch.

For Hussein Ahmed, it is important to have the names of each farmer he worked with
printed on the packets of the sold coffee goods (Photo courtesy of Mocha Hunters)

“I worked hard in bringing quality coffee from Yemen to my cafe and it was important for me to have the names of each farmer we worked with printed on the packets of the sold coffee goods or even mentioned in the menu. For example, one could get ‘Ismaili coffee’ or an ‘Alghayoul coffee'."

While his business was booming, his marriage ended in divorce. In 2012, he left the Japanese cafe behind and went back to Yemen to pursue his dream of establishing a coffee business.

When he arrived back in Yemen, the country was in the midst of political upheaval. Ahmed was not worried, however, because the coffee trade had survived past conflicts and economic hardships. Despite the deteriorating economy and an unemployment rate of around 60 percent among youth, Ahmed was determined to pursue his dream.

Hussein Ahmed believes Yemen's coffee is its 'hidden oil' and he has faith in its quality and
durability (Photo courtesy of Mocha Hunters)

“I knew for sure that while Yemen’s economy was crumbling, Yemeni coffee was [the country's] hidden oil,” he says.

In 2014, Ahmed went to Washington to attend an annual coffee conference run by the Specialty Coffee Association of America. As he was about to return to Yemen, the civil war broke out and airports were shut down. With no place to go, Ahmed stayed in the US. Expecting the war to end soon, Ahmed did odd jobs to pay the bills like working as an Uber driver and selling mobile phones in a shop.

“I had a rough experience living in the US over two years, and all that time I couldn’t get coffee out of my mind,” recalls Ahmed.

Hussein Ahmed believes that quality is more important than quantity and uses traditional
methods to bring this out (Photo courtesy of Mocha Hunters)

In 2016, he decided to return to Yemen in the heat of the civil war. “People I know in the US thought I was crazy to leave the US and go back to a war, but I was absolutely not afraid to go back to Yemen during the war. I had faith in Yemeni coffee’s durability [in] midst of crises. Our national history shows us how conflicts in Yemen come and go, and people in Yemen stand resilient, no matter what,” says Ahmed.

He succeeded in securing a seed fund of $150,000 from a Silicon Valley programme and officially registered Mocha Hunters in the US, before returning to Yemen, where he faced a bleak economic reality.

Hussein Ahmed has taught coffee farmers new skills such as cupping and coffee grading (Photo courtesy of Mocha Hunters)

The hashtag #YemenCoffeeBreak circulated through a social media campaign in 2015 led by the Small and Micro Enterprise Promotion Service, a national body. Wesam Qaid, its executive director, was impressed by Ahmed and his work.

“He has given farmers reasons to be optimistic,” says Qaid. “Ahmed didn’t only introduce farmers to speciality markets which have made their incomes double, but he has also taught them new skills such as cupping - a method to measure the quality of the coffee - and coffee grading.”

Hussein Ahmed believes that coffee brings people happiness and he will 'pursue fostering this plant
no matter what it takes' (Photo courtesy of Mocha Hunters)

“It was important for me to work closely with the farmers and enhance their practices,” Ahmed says, “because I wanted them to pay more attention to producing quality over quantity. I introduced more traditional techniques, using dry bed methods at night and utilising ‘moisture-level measurement’ machines which I brought from the US to measure the level of sugar and moist[ure] in the beans.”

“Despite the misery around us, I believe coffee is a source of happiness for many,” concludes Ahmed. “This plant has survived for centuries and it will survive this conflict.”

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*This feature was originally wrote for and published on Middle East Eye, 11th Dec. 2017. 

Between Despair and Hope: a Yemeni Entrepreneur’s Story in Sana’a

Saeed Alfagieh, 27, founded “Ana Mehani” in Sana’a end 2015,
after winning the first place at a 2014 entrepreneurship contest.

*While the surrealistic and tragic events in Yemen spin us all around, I need to take a moment to tell one story, just one personal story, from Sana’a, about defiance-pain-and-more-pain-despair-and-resilience (yes, just like that, in that order, all linked in a row, because that’s how my family and friends I talk to in Sana’a feel).

* * * *

When Forbes did a few months ago a feature on this inspiring young Yemeni man, Saeed Alfagieh, I believed I had my new hero. Despite a great deal of obstacles, Saeed developed his company “Ana Mehani” midst of the raging war in Sana’a, earning a name among the 100 best Arab startups for 2017 by World Economic Forum.





Saeed Alfagieh, 27, founded “Ana Mehani” in Sana’a end 2015, after winning the first place at a 2014 entrepreneurship contest and obtaining a financial support. Ana Mehani is an off-and-online social labor and marketplace platform that aims to generate jobs opportunities while the country is suffering from about 80% unemployment rate. So far, it covers 6 Yemeni governorates, including Sana’a - it receives daily more than 300 applications and has created more than 40,000 job opportunities.


One of Ana Mehani’s old videos interviewing workers benefiting from their services:



I contacted Saeed once the Forbes feature was published to tell him how he was a hero to me. He told me about the horrific environment he and his team operate in. He had lost many friends under the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Sana’a and yet he refused to give in to despair.

Saeed explained to me how Ana Mehani had to shift its focus and meet the war-related jobs demands; for example, whenever some people’s homes were partially damaged by the shelling, airstrikes and other war-related violence, or whenever some displaced people needed transportation and delivery for their belongings - his team stepped in and linked them with vetted community-based workers. Schools, houses and organizations buildings impacted by the air-strikes all found his services to be a necessity.

With about 10 members, Ana Mehani team aims to find job opportunities midst of the raging war in Yemen.

I wanted to write about Saeed from my own perspective, other than Forbes’ one, so I pitched to my editors. I had an initial green light from my editor at Al Jazeera English. So I wrote the piece. I sent it. My editor kept me waiting for about a month with no feedback. Then, I received a reply of an apology about not publishing the piece. The reply also included a note of how they prefer stories only from “the ground.”


I swallowed my frustration. And I tried to vent and tweet about it:

One of my editors just told me she wants my story to be from the ground. I wondered if she knew that Houthis in Yemen are the second abductor of journalists in the world after ISIS! 🤔

— Afrah Nasser 🇾🇪 (@Afrahnasser) October 8, 2017

Months passed by. Saleh was killed on Monday and the capital, Sana’a continues to be engulfed in flames. The fierce fighting between Houthi forces and pro-Saleh forces is destroying all aspect of life in Sana’a. After calling my mother, relatives and friends in Sana’a to check on them, I was thinking last night of Saeed. So I called.


Saeed greeted me with a tired voice.


“We are hanging on. We are working from home now as our office is right at where the clashes happen and I assume it became destroyed,” tells me Saeed, “no doubt, the current situation is not a reasonable working environment, although there are still high demands for jobs and services.”


Saeed voice becomes more tired when he tells me how he lost many international opportunities, in attending conferences and networks abroad. The blockade imposed on entry points to Yemen has crushed his dreams of enhancing his network and skills. “It kills my soul not being able to realize my dreams,” says Saeed.


We pose for seconds as if we mourn. In a helpless attempt to fill the silence, I ask Saeed, “which period was more difficult to deal with, business-wise? During the Saleh/Houthi vs. Hadi/Saudi fronts or during today’s events?”


“My team and I have a strong will to cope with whatever happens. We can see that there are increasing demands for our work, as the war rages on. However, today, the skyrocketing fuel prices are killing us and the Yemeni money exchange rate to dollars has jumped to 442 YR. This is leading us to … I don’t even have a word for it.”


“Are you still hopeful about the future,” I ask Saeed. “I have to be hopeful because I am alive - and I can’t wait for things to stabilize a little bit so we could scale up our work,” he replies.

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*This piece was originally published on the Huffingtonpost on the 8th of Dec. 2017.

My Interview with Mada Masr: On Saleh’s death and the worsening humanitarian crisis in Yemen

Sana'a, Yemen - Courtesy: Abdulwahab al-Ameri

*Events have unfolded rapidly in Yemen over the last few days. Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed by Houthi forces on Monday, following news he was moving away from his previous alliance with the Houthis toward new ties with the Saudi-led coalition that has been fighting them, and spurring an increase in violence in the Yemeni capital Sanaa.

Mada Masr spoke to Yemeni journalist Afrah Nasser about Saleh’s death, the deteriorating humanitarian situation, and the dynamics of living outside Yemen and speaking and writing about what is happening there.

Laura Bird: Were you surprised by the news of Saleh’s death? It must have been strange to see graphic images of the leader you grew up under and opposed in 2011 posted online. How did you feel when the news broke?

Afrah Nasser: I was shocked. I always believed Saleh’s alliance with the Houthis was very temporary. He was not only an influential man, he waged about six wars against the Houthis over the past decade and he always won — he even killed the leader of the Houthis. So I expected that he was going to win, but I underestimated the military power the Houthis had, thanks to Saleh. He also miscalculated this temporary alliance and I don’t think he ever thought they would turn the tables against him.

When I met Saleh in 2011, I understood how much this man was clinched to power. He thought he was irreplaceable, unmovable, untoppleable. His death must have even been a shock to him. He never thought that a youth movement on the ground, nor the Houthis, nor the Saudis, would take him away from power. So in that sense, as someone who was affiliated with the revolution, yes, the Houthis did what we couldn’t. But at the same time, they are another face of evil, another face of dictatorship — actually, one that is more brutal and based on sectarian ideology and extreme religious views.

LB: Why do you think Saleh made the decision to switch his allegiance at this point in the conflict? Was this a strategic political move, or one made out of “concern for the worsening humanitarian situation,” as Saleh claimed?

AN: It did look like Saleh was more concerned about the humanitarian situation than the Houthis, especially the looting and corruption within Houthi circles, but I think he felt they were after him and wanted to obtain a victory over them before this happened. They were never on the same page though; the only alliance they had was a temporary one against the Saudis. We’re dealing with two gangs, basically. Neither of them have any ethics or follow any political principles. They only want to survive and are thirsty for power and will crush anyone in their way until they get power. So Saleh realised that these guys were going to take him out so they could have an absolute grip over power and tried to make his move first.

LB: What do you think the ramifications of Saleh’s death are likely to be?

AN: I’m very worried about how the Saudis will scale up their military operation. Right now the Houthis are targeting every presidential building Saleh used to have, because they want to take control of all institutions. I am expecting a major military operation to hit the whole of the north of Yemen, not just Sanaa. This is a new chapter, more bloody than what has already come. I mean, if the war has killed 10,000 people already, this will multiply that number in the coming, not only weeks, but days, hours.

Maybe the Saudis will try to invest in Saleh’s son, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh. I mean, even the name will garner sympathy on the ground in Yemen. The Houthis have force, but they don’t have popularity among many people in Yemen. And this will be the defining clash, if they win through military force. We will see, nobody knows.

The next round totally depends on how Yemenis react — the politicians, President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, it’s really up to all of these actors in the south, whether state or non-state, and how they respond. The Saudis, the Emiratis, they can only give them the tools, but it’s up to them how they orchestrate a response against the Houthis. It will be a darker scenario. Who will lead the country? Now Saleh is gone, the state is gone, nobody is ruling.

LB: Have you been able to reach friends and relatives in Yemen? What is daily life like for them, and what have some of their reactions been to events of the last week?

AN: Interestingly enough, the internet is working fine. People are terrified. They are not only in shock, they are scared, and many of them are censoring themselves. They don’t want to talk on the phone, they know that phones are tapped. The Houthis are storming into houses affiliated with Saleh and taking young men. Prisons are full, we don’t know the numbers, but I am estimating that thousands of young men have been arrested by Houthi forces.

I can’t reveal a lot of what my family is telling me on the ground, because that would risk their lives. People are being stopped on the streets in Sanaa and their phones searched and their last calls and social media checked. I can’t even use my privilege of being outside the country to talk explicitly about it anymore.

LB: Can you give us some context on the various players, coalitions and factions in Yemen?

AN: It’s very important to explain that Yemen was under three different authorities. In the north, there was the Saleh and Houthi coalition, which had been ruling the north since the start of the conflict. And then, in the south, for two or more years, there was a coalition between the Southern secession movement, the Saudi-led coalition, with the upper hand given to the Emiratis in the south, and forces of Hadi, the “legitimate government,” though he doesn’t have much power. Most of the power was held by the coalition between the secessionist movement, or leaders, and the Emiratis.

And then there are a number of flourishing armed groups — Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, you name it. In fact, the conflict produced more armed groups than existed before because there are growing divisions and different interests between the Saudis and the Emiratis, so each is funding different militant groups. I know this even though I’m not there, because some of my colleagues and journalists have been abducted by armed groups, and tortured while being interrogated about their social media activities. A close journalist friend of mine was questioned by an extremist group. And it’s not just journalists, even social activists are victims of the chaos in the south. One activist, his father just wrote to me, because I tried to raise his issue at the UN Human Rights Council; he was assassinated by one of the leaders of these armed groups. I mean, we already had Al-Qaeda as a stronghold in Yemen, but today there are numerous Al-Qaedas, many groups, and we don’t know who funds them.

LB: I’m interested in your conversations with people back home, and how you talk about what’s been happening, about violence, particularly across generations. Do you have similar ways of speaking about things?

AN: Every time I call my mother in Sanaa, especially recently, she’s busy going to a funeral or coming back from a funeral; of relatives and distant relatives, and relatives of friends. People are dying. Death is in every house, and my mother — she’s not really politically engaged, she doesn’t care so much about the politics of the conflict — said to me, “the media keeps saying, ‘Saudis want to fight Iran,’ so go ahead and bomb them. We’re not Iran. Why not bomb them? It’s their proxy war. It’s not our fault. Did we do something wrong here?”

At the beginning of the conflict, people somehow normalized and rationalized things. But it got much worse — When Houthis attacked close to Riyadh airporton November 4, the Saudis freaked out and blocked all entries to Yemen. I remember the morning I was traveling to the US to attend the Committee to Protect Journalists award ceremony, my mother texted me and said, “All entries to Yemen are closed, we will die, we will die,” and I felt just helpless. And this is my mother, what about people who really don’t know more about the blockade? Life is just hell and people will die in silence and the world won’t know about them. I can’t imagine another place where 25-27 million people are trapped with no way to leave or for others to come, while neighboring countries that are some of the world’s richest are part of a coalition that’s bombing them. The cruelty of this war is multilayered.

On the ground life is very, very harsh. Electricity is sparse and the country is paralyzed on many levels. Institutions aren’t working. Civil servants have not been paid their salaries for over a year. Some of my relatives have lost their jobs and are barely surviving with half of their salaries and donations. Plus, there is no trade. Yemen is off the map.

LB: What information is getting through to people in Yemen generally about what is happening nationally and internationally?

AN: On the ground, people are living under, I wouldn’t say a media blackout, but they get information from a media that is extremely controlled, whether from one side or another. The Houthis in the north control all media. Some of my colleagues in Sanaa are in jail. I see their pictures and hashtags. I remember telling my mother that I was going live at the CPJ award ceremony, and she asked me what I was planning to talk about. I told her, attacks against journalists, and she said to me, “Tell them if you were in Sanaa now, you would be in jail.” People understand that all critical journalists, or independent journalists, have vanished. Some of them are missing, half of them have been put on trial without any any charges. At the beginning of the war, the leader of the Houthis went on TV and said, “journalists are more of an enemy than those we fight on the battlefield.” Even in the south, the Saudis and Emiratis fund who they want to. There is no space for any other independent media. So if people watch TV in Yemen, they hear the narrative of this side or that side. And Arab media is also very polarized. The Saudis have bought the silence of a lot of media outlets. Wikileaks has documents that show bribes to Lebanese and Egyptian media — the big media in the Middle East. And international media is reluctant to send journalists, given how risky and expensive it is to get access to Yemen. It’s mainly independent journalists that try to go, and when they do, it’s extremely difficult. It’s impossible to get permission from the various authorities and to have free mobility inside. So you need patience and money and contacts to access Yemen and get the story. As a local Yemeni on the ground, when you turn on the TV, you don’t see the whole picture of what’s happening in your own country, but you know that your friends and your relatives are dying.

LB: Why do you think it had to get to this point before global media focused more on Yemen in recent months? What shifted or changed in your opinion?

AN: I think this is because of three main factors: Firstly, the Qatar crisis last year. After which Al Jazeera focused on Yemen and had greater freedom to say the Saudis are doing this and that, even Al Jazeera English. A story I wrote was rejected by Al Jazeera pre-Qatar crisis, in which I went after all warring sides, but was told, “A higher editorial order said this story can’t be published.” I was balanced, but I sensed this had something to do with Qatar being careful and not wanting to disturb the Saudi-led coalition. However, I believe that the best thing that happened for the situation in Yemen was the Qatar crisis. When you have a media outlet that’s so widely read in the Middle East and by international media focussing on Yemen more explicitly, it influences public opinion.

Secondly, the humanitarian situation is horrific. I think it’s a disgrace what’s happening in Yemen. There will be a time when we will talk about how the UN and international system failed. You know, Yemen will be one of those examples. And thirdly, the Houthi missiles and the Saudis saying we’re going to close everything. For them to scale this up was alarming and got the attention of a lot of world leaders.

LB: Watching the BBC’s coverage of Yemen recently, I was shocked by the absence of political analysis. Why do you think this is, and how can we amplify the voices of Yemenis in global media?

AN: I don’t know if you’ve seen the Sanaa Review. We’re trying to develop it. It’s independent and voluntarily based. I think the main reason there is no analysis about the exit of this war is because it’s an inconvenient war. It’s no longer a local conflict. The solution isn’t just in the hands of Yemenis anymore. It’s an international conflict, in my opinion, with international actors involved, and thus the solution also lies in their hands, and they don’t want to do their homework, or act. There are a number of people who could lead peace efforts. The UN special envoy should be doing his job, but it’s been more than a year since there were any peace talks that he led. I assume he’s not accessible to media. He’s much less present than the Syrian envoy, for example. On Twitter, the Yemen envoy blocked so many people who were critical. My suggestion, something I tried to push for during my recent advocacy trip to Washington DC and in meetings with international organizations, is that there has to be a new UN special envoy and conflict resolution has to be from the ground up, with a team of tribal leaders, politicians, Yemeni business people, etc. — together they can formulate some kind of “Yemen Peace Plan.” There should be a team alongside a UN mechanism that can find a way forward. The situation today is a different political reality to when the war started, and that should be considered.

Another possibility is that a world leader could step in without being invited, to formulate some kind of way out. This happened with John Kerry, the US secretary of state. He tried to propose a roadmap, but it failed. We need more. US President Donald Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner both seem to think that Saudi Arabia is doing the right thing and that they can just continue, so then we need someone else. Who can bring a better road map? The problem is the Houthis want a guarantee that they will have a share in whatever political system is going to come. And the Saudis want a guarantee that the Houthis won’t have a share in any political deal. The UN special envoy, whenever he goes to the Houthis, he only brings what the Saudis are trying to convey, and he never really represents what the Houthis want. We are lacking that person that could come and formulate a solution for all parties somehow.

LB: I remember in a recent conversation you had at the War Resisters League in the US, you were asked about your personal political opinion, and you said, “Neutrality doesn’t mean silence or inaction.” Does this present problems for you when speaking to people in Yemen and in the diaspora? Do you think violence entrenches beliefs and polarizes people more politically?

AN: The conflict reshuffled how people relate to each other and what Yemen represents to them. For me, I come from a mixed-race background. I’m Ethiopian and Yemeni. My grandfathers were Yemeni, and they left Yemen because of a similar situation of war and famine. They went to Ethiopia, settled down there and married and had children, and then there was conflict and they had to go back to Yemen. So, for me, the world doesn’t stop and end in Yemen. My identity is influenced by many cultures. So,if today I’m in Yemen and I want to position myself, it doesn’t matter if it’s Houthi, if it’s rebel, if it’s in the south. For me, it’s more about Yemen the concept. And I think that plays a huge role for many opinion leaders in Yemen. I would argue that most open and liberal (in the Arab sense) and pro-democracy opinion leaders in Yemen come from a different background, with a mother from the south or a father from the north. The priority is Yemen the concept, the nationality.

But for the Houthis in particular, I think it’s a matter of class. Today, the class differences in Yemen are based on race and regionalism. So the Houthis come from Sa’dah, and many of them are direct descendants of Prophet Mohamed. They don’t marry outside this bloodline. This is considered the highest class, and then you have the tribes and you have the judges’ families. That’s unfortunately how our racism, or discrimination, manifests itself. There is another class that includes people with jobs that are considered demeaning, and which includes musicians, butchers, hairdressers, etc. Then there is the factor of regional difference. If you’re in the south or north, or from this tribe or village. This is how the polarization usually is, but the war has split these camps along different lines — the Houthis, the Saudis, if you’re not with this, you’re against that. But, to be honest, as the war drags on, there are many people who are changing positions as well, whether they try to understand the atrocities committed by this or that camp, or they see more what is at stake for them. Also, depending on whether or not they want to go back to Yemen. I know some people who left and will never go back.

The diaspora is also split in similar ways to what is happening on the ground — certain camps and organizations are on social media. But, in my opinion, in the Yemen case, they’re doing more harm than good. Few diaspora groups or organizations are taking the side of neutrality with action — trying to advocate for peace or more humanitarian attention, or even getting politically active — they are a minority, and this is another contributing factor to why the war is continuing. I would love to do some research on this and prove how these groups are destroying discourse that could end the war. The diaspora is another camp to the war, because of their access and influence.

LB: What do you see your role as, living outside Yemen and working as a journalist?

AN: I remember watching [Mada Masr editor-in-chief] Lina Attalah posing a question during a seminar recently about how one can contribute to telling a story despite the distance. That question kept me thinking for some time. I see how the Yemeni diaspora is growing, with youth applying for asylum in different places or being displaced. However, now that I am a Swedish citizen and free to travel, I am thinking of moving to somewhere in the Middle East to be closer to events in Yemen and to join this new Yemeni diaspora in the Middle East. I want to answer Lina’s question of how to be in a collective even if you are away from your country, and how we are witnesses to tragedies in our homelands.

We work in exceptional circumstances. Life in Yemen has become unlivable, both on the humanitarian level and in terms of free expression. The Houthis were ranked last year by Reporters Without Borders as the second biggest abductor of journalists after the Islamic State. That’s how non-existent space is for critical independent journalists in Yemen. I believe that in such situations, one can step out for a while, but remain engaged in the debates and updates. I remember when the war broke out in Sanaa and the Saudi-led coalition began its airstrikes on March 26, 2015. I can’t forget how it was me who broke the news to my family in Sanaa in a phone call. Their response was, “We keep hearing bombs, but we have no idea what’s happening — the city is in a complete blackout.”

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*Originally published at Mada Masr, done by Laura Bird - Dec. 7, 2017. 

Saleh's death, checkmate

*A political earthquake hit Yemen yesterday, as ousted Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh was dramatically thrown out of the political scene following his death at the hands of Houthis. 

In a deja vu moment, I was reminded of Gaddafi's fate in 2011, and the atmosphere at the start of the 2011 Arab uprisings as a video circulated of Saleh's dead body being dragged onto a truck by armed men.





In a country known for its deep-rooted "revenge culture", Saleh, in some senses, dug his own grave, when many held him responsible for the 2004 death of the Houthis' godfather Hussein Bader al-Din al-Houthi, older brother of current Houthi leader, Abdelmalek al-Houthi.

Voices in the video cry, "we are having revenge for you, Hussein". Murdering Hussein was only one highlight of Saleh's 33-year rule that was tainted with bloodshed.

As Saleh leaves a legacy of political manoeuvring, corruption, and chaos in the country, his death is believed to be the result of a betrayal within his inner circle, from where sensitive information about Saleh's whereabouts was leaked and a trap prepared.

In his televised speech after Saleh's death, Abdelmalek al-Houthi expressed his gratitude, "towards those 'honorary' Yemeni officials who helped us (Houthis) capture the 'traitor' Saleh".



The Houthi field and military leader, Abou Ali Alhakem reportedly spoke hours before Saleh's death, describing how Saleh's calls with UAE and KSA were tapped, which for him provided evidence of his treason.



This is neither a victory to Houthis nor a defeat to Saleh, despite his death. Both leaders are heads of an unleashed dragon that was, and is still willing for all hell to break loose. However, for the man who was well-known for being the most influential politician in the country, there is no question his death poses a greater threat to Yemen's future, and brings serious ramifications.

During the first days of Yemen's 2011 uprising, I was one of a group of revolutionaries taken to meet Saleh at his palace in Sanaa. "What do you and your friends want?" he asked. We all fearlessly replied, "We want to topple the regime. If not, change your cabinet." Our talk lasted less than 10 minutes as Saleh got up yelling, displeased with our demands, and left the room.

We were allowed to leave and went back to the protests, with Change Square determined to continue the uprising. Me, and all my friends there were born under Saleh's rule.

We have only known one president in our lifetime and never imagined the possibility of replacing him. Although Saleh was regarded as immortal after he survived a fatal assassination attempt in 2011, today we are in disbelief as for the first time, we are truly seeing a Yemen without Saleh.

Saleh's death creates an acute power imbalance as Sanaa city has been under heavy fighting on the ground and air-strikes of the Saudi-led coalition. Civilian inhabitants have been trapped and under siege over the past few days in areas of fighting where there is no food, water or medicine.

I call my family in Sanaa every hour to check on their safety, as the death toll of these recent clashes has jumped to at least 125, with 238 wounded. While civilians pay the heaviest price, the Saudi-led coalition is also paying for losing their last card in their almost three-year-long unwinnable war against the Houthis. Losing Saleh and all the intelligence support he could have provided the coalition with mean the Saudis face a great vacuum in their strategic approach to confronting the Houthis.

The Saudis will likely scale up their military operations. Heavy airstrike shelling going on in Sanaa as I write spells out a bleak scenario, with Sanaa looking potentially like another Mosul.


It seems the situation will likely have to get worse before any prospect of improvement. For a country suffering from a huge heritage of impunity and an absolute lack of accountability, yesterday's events bring the initial problem of Yemen's 2011 uprising back to the surface: The unrealised dreams of millions, that envisaged Yemen as a civil state in which equal citizenship and justice were guaranteed for all.

When Sanaa's Change Square became the focal point for Yemeni pro-democracy protests in 2011, one of the first posters to appear at the square was "welcome to the first step towards our civil state".


Today, the enemy of that dream is the extremist vision the Houthis work to impose, restoring the old Yemeni Imamate system as a futuristic political system. Our recent national memory shows how Yemenis could have dealt with Houthi invasion, as the capital witnessed many anti-Houthi protests raising slogans, such as "no for coup" and "no to armed militias".

The fate of Yemen as a united republic lies in the hands of Yemenis. Today's events are the peak of the clash between the essence of Yemen's 2011 uprising, and the Houthi insurgency - between revolutionary ideas and far-right-politics.

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*Article first published on The New Arab, today. 

Satirical Shows Lighten the Mood Amid Yemen's War

My latest on Aljazeera English.

Satirists use their platform not only to entertain the Yemeni public but also to subvert rival media narratives.

As the war grinds on, satire 'embodies the only fulfilling means of venting', says Yemeni TV host Mohammed al-Rabaa [Photo courtesy of Mohammed al-Rabaa]

Satire has become an oasis for war-fatigued Yemenis - a temporary escape from the gruelling realities of life in a combat zone. "I think things have been so suffocating in Yemen that satire today embodies the only fulfilling means of venting," Yemeni TV host Mohammed al-Rabaa told Al Jazeera.


Rabaa is one of the most popular political satirists in Yemen, having made his breakthrough during Yemen's 2011 uprising with an amateur video (see below) satirising a local politician. He attributes the popularity of satire to "its ability to speak far more to the Yemeni audience than traditional news media".




Even though the uprising presented new opportunities for political satire in Yemen, the genre is not new in the country. In the 1950s, Abdullah Abdulwahab Noman launched the al-Fudhool satirical newspaper in the port city of Aden, providing a platform for satirical takes on current events. Issued every two weeks, the paper tackled everything from corruption to food insecurity, including a piece featuring a starving TV presenter who almost fainted while asking viewers to donate food.

In the 1950s, Abdullah Abdulwahab Noman launched the al-Fudhool satirical newspaper.

In the ensuing years, satirists continued to parody their political leaders via song and on radio shows. The 1980s saw the launch of the famous satirical radio show Basmah (A Smile) on Sanaa State Radio. Established by the late Yemeni journalist Mohammed al-Mahbshi and journalist Ali al-Sayani, it airs each Ramadan and is re-run at other times throughout the year, satirising issues of corruption in the country.

Under former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Basmah satirised the lack of democratic elections in Yemen; today, it takes aim at the Saudi-led coalition and the government of Yemen's president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The station on which it airs was taken over by Houthi rebels in September 2014.

"Since its creation in 1982, Basmah broke the mould and was certainly one of a kind," Suad al-Wisy, a host at Sanaa State Radio, told Al Jazeera. "Today, it reflects the concerns and frustrations many feel in Sanaa, regardless of which authority carries the radio. However, I think the show doesn't enjoy the same listenership it used to have, as there is a rise of many other radio channels attracting our audience."

Yemen's satirical landscape is heavily infused with partisan and sectarian overtones. Satirists use their platform not only to entertain but also to subvert rival media narratives.

Bahashwan, who began as a social satirist, shifted his focus to political satire as the Houthis began their armed fight in Aden in early 2015.

Aden-born Karam Bahashwan, who began his career as a satirist via YouTube in 2013 in Aden, today hosts a weekly show called Wala Nakhs (Shut Up) that is broadcast into Yemen from Istanbul, Turkey, on the Belqees television channel, well known for its anti-Houthi/anti-Saleh reporting.

Bahashwan, who began as a social satirist, shifted his focus to political satire as the Houthis began their armed fight in Aden in early 2015. "In that violent and intense political situation, one can't help but shift to politics. I realised that the main source of all of Yemen's problems was political," Bahashwan told Al Jazeera, noting that he hopes his show can bring laughter to the public, while also raising their political awareness.

Satirising Hadi's government and the Saudi-led coalition is a primary focus for Abdel Hafez Moujab, who hosts a daily programme on al-Sahat TV channel, presenting a counter-narrative to pro-Hadi shows. His programme, Maa al-Akhbar (With the News) airs from Lebanon. 

Satire is 'a useful way to expose lies, especially in light of the Yemen war and the media misinformation', says Abdel Hafez Moujab [Photo courtesy of Abdel Hafez Moujab]

"After many years in journalism, I chose political satire eventually. I found it a useful way to expose lies, especially in light of the Yemen war and the media misinformation," Moujab told Al Jazeera. "I aspire to offer a more truthful depiction through my simplicity and cynicism in analysing the news. I think my political humour brings the viewer closer to current events, and it grabs their attention more than the traditional media."

With Yemen ranked one of the most dangerous places for media groups to operate, many such shows are being hosted outside the country. "Media groups can't work inside the country freely, while there are increasing attacks against the press," Ahmed al-Zurqa, an Istanbul-based Yemeni journalist, told Al Jazeera, noting that various media outlets within Yemen have come under the control of different armed groups. "It's an extremely hostile situation for media."

Meanwhile, anti-Houthi satirist Mohammed al-Athroui - regarded by many Yemenis as a pioneer in the country's political satire scene, having sung satirical songs on television since the 1990s, such as Toz (Whatever) and Ham Shaab (A Nation's Concern) - has continued his work throughout the war. His show Ghagha (Cacophony), which airs long-prepared episodes every Ramadan on the Islamist Party Islah's television channel, is broadcast from Saudi Arabia, as the channel's official offices were looted by the Houthis in 2015.

Ghagha includes sketches and songs that heavily mock Shia scholars (watch below), prompting fierce criticism from pro-Houthi media outlets. "I respect our religion and all sects, and I don't aim to insult anyone, but [rather] to uncover some of the Houthis' fictitious tales," Athroui told Al Jazeera. The dangers of his work are clear: A pro-Houthi judge in Sanaa recently issued a statement on Facebook advocating Athroui's death "for his deliberate and repeated insults" against prominent Shia religious figures. "I am not scared; in fact, I am certain now that my show is very influential," Athroui maintained.




Rabaa says he has also received death threats because of his work; in one instance, his home was hit by bullets. "Over the course of Yemen's war, Houthi supporters have tried to abduct my sister, attacked my brother and confiscated my house in Amran," he said.

After more than two years of war, Yemen is now in the midst of a massive humanitarian crisis threatening millions of lives. Despite the appalling outlook, satirical shows have found a way to lighten the mood - taking aim at everything from political oppression, to the crisis of unpaid civil-servant salaries (watch below), to the Houthis' hijacking of military institutions. Rabaa says he remains determined to forge ahead.



"Yemenis are reminded of famine, disease and devastation all the time, but they have forgotten how to smile, and that's what we try to remind them of," Rabaa said. "We don't mock our misery, but we mock those who led us to the misery."