The Gulf will control Yemen forever if the south secedes now

*Recent dramatic events in southern Yemen mirror the vicious circle in which the country finds itself, two years into a war that has killed at least 10,000 – and reflect a struggle between President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and his Emirati and Saudi backers.

In late April, after major tensions with the Emirati who have been backing him, Hadi dismissed two southern secessionists - Aidarus al-Zubaidi, the governor of Aden, and cabinet minister Hani bin Braik. In response, tens of thousands of people protested in Aden in early May and the southern seccessionist movement suddenly saw an opening for the prospect for independence in the middle of war.

On 11 May, Zubaidi announced that he and other officials were forming an autonomous body – the Southern Political Council – to manage Yemen’s southern provinces and represent the south domestically and internationally. Southerners have been campaigning for independence for years. Their grievances stem from the 1990s when North and South Yemen unified and then fought one another in a civil war in 1994.

After the war, the southerners accused the unified Yemeni government, based in the northern city of Sanaa, of corruption, election fraud and seizing their oil and gas-rich land. In 2007, they formally organised into the Southern Movement – known as Hirak - to secede. But the establishment of the new council and even the protests that have followed are unlikely to bring the secession which many southerners have long envisioned. Trying to secede right now is like trying to build a house in a hurricane.




Losing face

The southerners’ move is especially ill-timed given how weak their movement has grown and how its political context has changed since its founding. Following Yemen’s 2011 uprising, there has been a violent crackdown against Hirak leaders, including several assassinations which have further undermined the movement’s political wing.

The remaining Hirak leaders now either live outside the country, with many residing in Gulf countries, the UK and the US, and/or are affiliated with the Emirates. Given Hadi’s spat with Bin Zayed and Zubaidi’s announcement, it’s also clear that the movement is heavily influenced today by what the Saudis and the Emirates want. As ousted Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh said earlier this month, “Events in Aden are only a play and the decision is in the hands of Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud."

But do Gulf countries want this influence? Earlier this month, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) issued a statement opposing the formation of the Southern Political Council in Aden because secession is exactly what they do not want.

For the south to achieve statehood within a failing state would only make Gulf countries lose face. The GCC would never allow that to happen. The GCC went to war in Yemen to restore what it began after Yemen’s 2011 uprising with its political plan, known as "the GCC initiative" - which firmly rejected the division of Yemen - and it won’t cease its engagement in Yemen until its plan is achieved. With the changing dynamics of the war, a southern secession for the Hirak movement would mean only a split from the GCC initiative, not from a state, because, technically, the north no longer has a functioning government and the south has a remote government, operating out of Riyadh. 

The decisive factor
As a Yemeni seeing my country descend into a failed state, I believe that, if there is any concept of Yemen as a state, then it’s a state controlled by the GCC. So if the south plans to split, it should rethink who is actually in control of Yemen’s sovereignty today. The Yemen war has drastically changed the rules of the game. Hirak’s rivalry has changed its face. Southerners used to face enforced control by the north, but now it’s control by their neighbours.

Some believe that because the international community doesn’t support the Hirak, it is doomed to fail, but I disagree. In fact, the fate of Hirak depends on the approval or disapproval by the GCC. History has taught us Yemenis that Yemen is the backyard of Gulf countries and it will always be under their control. Southern activists whom I recently spoke with on the condition of their anonymity affirmed their belief that secession would be realised, especially with the support of neighbouring countries.

One secessionist activist told me, “Despite all the flaws, the formation of the council is one step towards the right direction. We are working on convincing the Saudis and the Emirates, especially that UAE has always been more understanding to our case.” Before the war and even before the 2011 uprising, southern grievances were clearly identifiable and unique. Today, the grievances are much broader and sit in an entirely different context: a country torn by war, with thousands killed and injured, with crippled institutions and ravaged by a catastrophic humanitarian crisis.

As much as secessionists desire statehood, how the war proceeds and whether their breakaway would ever actually happen is entirely up to the regional states now involved.

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*This article was first published in MiddleEastEye.com on the 22nd of May, 2017.
*Photography courtesy: Ahmed Shihab Al-Qadi, in Aden, taken 21st of May, 2017. 

Fractured unions new and old: South Yemen independence day

Nov 30, 2016 - From the South Yemen Independence day celebration in Aden, Yemen. A soldier holding Yemen's Southern flag. Photo courtesy: Ahmed Shihab Al-qadi. 

*Today marks the 49th anniversary of South Yemen's independence from the British colony.

The anniversary should symbolise a time for rejoicing at the triumph over a colonial rule, but instead, it reflects the growing and contesting realities across Yemen.

Ever since the Southern Movement (Hirak) began in 2007, South Independence Day has become a time where the question of unity versus partition in the country manifests itself profoundly. The tension is all the more present given today's ongoing conflict.

Independence Day is of conflicting significance to the south and the north of Yemen, illustrating the rift between the two regions and the path towards partition the country finds itself on.

On one hand, as a continuation of the same spirit of liberty and the struggle for independence against the Brits, a great deal of the south takes the occasion to continue raising calls for independence from their latest virulent foe, the north; especially in the wake of Houthi takeover of the capital Sanaa in September, 2014.

One Adeni blogger writes, "after Ansar Allah's [the Houthis] coup against president Hadi's legitimacy, his detention and forcing him to resign, the southerners - even those who are pro-unity and were anti-secession - are totally convinced that people in the North don't believe in unity as they couldn't tolerate that a Southerner president [Hadi] would rule them.

Nov 30, 2016 - From the South Yemen Independence day celebration in Aden, Yemen. A man holding Yemen's Southern flag. Photo courtesy: Ahmed Shihab Al-qadi. 

With this magnified support for Hadi, and, as stated by the former colonel and founder of Hirak, and the Yemeni Retired Military Consultative Association, Nasser al-Noubi, "with this coup, unity was over".

Houthi brutality at the beginning of the war in Aden in the name of fighting Islamic State did not leave room for southerners to cling to unity, according to the Adeni blogger. As a result, the bloodshed of Houthis and of Saleh's forces in the South during the ongoing war caused the grievances of southerners to intensify, and demand secession from the "northern" government in Sanaa.

And on the other hand, in a delusional manner, in the north, ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh and Houthi leaders are taking the opportunity this anniversary - particularly in light of the Saudi-led coalition strikes hitting the country - to mobilise northerners and southerners alike in standing united against the new "coloniser" (the Saudis) and fight back.

Over the two-year war, this is the second time Saleh has addressed the public, calling on them to cherish unity and fight united for victory against "the Saudis' aggression".

Ironically, South Independence Day for the North evokes the desire to win over the Saudis and it fails to evoke a reflection of the North's injustices against the South, at least in the course of the ongoing civil war. Certainly, independence means two totally different things for the North and the South in Yemen today.

Nov 30, 2016 - From the South Yemen Independence day celebration in Aden, Yemen. Photo courtesy: Saleh al-Obaidi. 

Fragile unity

Ever since the 1994 civil war in Yemen, the rift between the North and South has been growing ever deeper. Following the north's win over the south, the country has suffered from multifaceted local cleavages.

I remember as a child surviving the almost three-month long fight in Sanaa. In the following months and years, we were taught as part of the curriculum that the 1994 civil war was caused by the "secessionist" "infidels" giving a strong impression that the north was more concerned about unity and the south had perpetrated the betrayal.

Nov 30, 2016 - From the South Yemen Independence day celebration in Aden, Yemen. A poster reads, 'South Yemen Independence day. Thank you, Salman, thank you, Khalifa, thank you, the Arab coalition."
Photo courtesy: Saleh al-Obaidi. 

Fast forward to the present, and distrust between the north and the south is at its peak. To justify killing, and stripping them of their "Yemeniness", Houthi-Saleh militiamen have called the southerners IS supporters. Not only did this greatly undermine any sense of unity, but also any sense of a common national identity.

Despite the disappearances and the assassination of many Hirak activists, calls for secession or independence - depending on who you talk to - are still alive.

Unity versus Partition

When I talked with southern activists Rasha Jarhum and Khaled Al-Abbadi, I had a glimpse of their vision for the Hirak, one which has certainly been challenged by the ongoing war.

The fragmentation process is occurring across two dimensions: fighting on the ground, and in the political corridors of diplomacy. In today's conflict, the Hirak in Aden is in the hands of a coalition of separatist militia, jihadis and Salafists, orchestrating their secession.

Nov 30, 2016 - From the South Yemen Independence day celebration in Aden, Yemen.
Photo courtesy: Ahmed Shihab Al-qadi. 

Meanwhile, at the UN, Hirak activists are making concerted efforts to win the international community's support for their demands. However, southern activists are divided: some demand secession, regardless of ending Yemen's war, and others demand peace first for all Yemen, and then secession.

Nonetheless, the war may serve the Hirak's best interests, considering the latest development that saw Saleh and the Houthis form a cabinet two days ago. Following their formation of The Supreme Political Council and its announcement of a new government, the country is clearly falling under the control of two states.

This chaotic governance is a product of several factors: the stalemate in the battle for Sanaa, the failure of international actors to carry out peacemaking efforts in Yemen and the fact that none of the warring sides has made major gains.




Given the unwinnable nature of Yemen's war, these dynamics stress the growing complexity of not only unity in Yemen, but they also highlight the question of the form of peace war-torn Yemen desperately needs.

Nov 30, 2016 - From the South Yemen Independence day celebration in Aden, Yemen. Photo courtesy: Saleh al-Obaidi.

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*This piece was first published on The New Arab, on the 30th November. 

Realignment of Yemen's Identity Politics

Yemen in Sam Kalda's illustration

*As a blogger on Human Rights issues in Yemen for the past six years, I am stunned by the growing polarisation in the country; to take an even-handed stance for human rights is either viewed as treasonous act, or as a sectarian bias. If you criticise both the Saudi-led Arab coalition air strikes and the Houthi-Saleh alliance forces, the supporters of both camps accuse you of supporting one side over the other. It’s us or them, both sides maintain; no middle ground.

Throughout my activism, it was easy for me to remain in that middle ground due to my mixed Ethiopian-Yemeni background which influenced my strong faith in fundamental human rights for all people, regardless of their color of skin, ethnicity, gender, religious belief, etc. Having myself lived some of the ugly consequences of the abuse of human rights, in my case, that is racism, I developed a great sensibility of Yemen’s identity politics. Today, I perceive how people's definition of their identities in Yemen - whether in line with tribal, sectarian or class-based affinities - is realigning itself along with the new political order.

***

Growing up in Yemen, a country with a strict hierarchical class system was not an easy thing, especially for someone like myself with mixed-ethnic identity. My story, like the story of many multi-ethnic Yemenis, goes back to the time when my two Yemeni grandfathers, frustrated by the economic and political situation, had a leap of faith and left Yemen to find a better life elsewhere.

Yemeni ports served as a conduit for migration. Due geographic proximity, the African horn was the destination for many migration waves coming from Yemen. Going east was also a popular destination for southeastern Yemenis. For my northern grandfathers Ethiopia was the choice of destination. They settled and married two Ethiopian ladies (my grandmothers) and had children (among them are my later-to-be my parents). It is estimated that there were 300,000 - 400,000 Yemenis in Ethiopia at that time. Following the revolution of 1962 in north of Yemen, the revolution of 1963 in its South and the dictatorship of Mengistu in their host country, many Yemeni migrants, including my grandparents, decided to go back to their home country in the 1970s. Some were forced to go back to Yemen by the emergence of communism in Ethiopia and its nationalisation policies that ripped them off the little wealth they worked hard to create, yet some were lured by the political change that had taken place at home. With a revolutionary perspective, Yemen’s former president, the late Ibrahim Al Hamdi was a key figure in calling on Yemenis abroad to return as he embarked on the road of nation building. Thus, my Yemeni-Ethiopian parents migrated back to Yemen.

by Sam Kalda

In Yemen’s class system, unlike the “Akhdam”, a degrading term used to describe a dark-skinned minority who are believed to be the descendants of Ethiopian invaders from the sixth century and who has been enduring a history of discrimination, I found myself located at the “Muwaladeen” categorisation, a term used to describe Yemenis born to foreign parents; the term was meant to racify the “half-Yemeni”, thus I struggled with both an identity crisis and racism. The most problematic issue though was the interplay between racism and classism. Growing up in Sana’a where at school I had my first encounter with Yemen’s multiplex social structure, my classmates bragged about their different classes; such as, Qadi and Hashemite class. As a kid, I was most intrigued and struck by the latter.

Hashemite class claims direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, and many Hashemites see the superiority of their class above all outside their clan, and there has been a widespread concern among Yemenis that members of the Hashemite class, alongside with the Houthi movement, are fostering visions of restoring a religious imamite and resuming hierarchical supremacy. Families belonging to this lineage composes a form of nobility in Yemen, with many of them marrying only within their class. North-Yemen, once ruled by zaidi hashemite dynasties from the very same north where Houthis come from, was freed from their reign by a coup d’etat in 1962 against the last Imam, Mohammed Al Badr Bin Hamidaddin, establishing the Yemen Arab Republic. This resulted in a civil war between the royalists and the republicans which lasted until the end of the sixties.


In today’s context, it’s crucial to remember that the Imam used to be the supreme representative of the Shia Zaidi Hashemite class, ruling north of Yemen in their name; much like how the Houthi movement is currently claiming to represent the Shia Zaidis. The main concern now is whether the reign of the Houthis would reproduce the old hierarchical class system, from which Yemen has not been fully liberated in its fifty years of the republic.


Being part of two cultures, two settings and two forms of being problematised Yemen’s identity politics for me and my hybridity forced a rift between me and home. Nonetheless, it provided me with a critical outlook of political and social issues. Even more intensely today, as I live abroad, the vision I have towards Yemen is a vision of plurality. Thus, my Human Rights activism as a blogger since 2011 has been modeled by my belief in a Yemen that guarantees its citizens a social structure where they can live in with their cultural complexities and diverse identities & ethnicities that have been historically shaped by the decisions Yemenis have made.

***

Yemen in Sam Kalda's illustration

Although Yemen's complex political, social and cultural structures have managed to function as a fluid equilibrium on the surface, there have always been chronic identity tensions.

Until Yemen's 2011 uprising, these identity tensions were influenced by two major factors: the unification in 1990 and the aftermath of the civil war in 1994, resulting in major rifts between north and south. Some contend that one of the causes of the tensions was former President Ali Abdullah Saleh's forced seizure of the lands in the south, leading to discontent among southerners over his rule.

Another likely cause was when southerners realised that the new oil finds in the south that formed more than 40 percent of Yemen's reserves back then would have supported South Yemen's smaller population if they had not been seized by the north. Furthermore, during my personal observations in the country, there was a feeling in South Yemen, particularly among "de-tribalised" people, who felt that they should (re-)define themselves as tribes to be taken seriously by the new ruling system in the north.

Saleh's approach to leadership further complicated identity relations. His leadership was based on divide and rule and his tactics on prioritising the survival and benefit of his own family and tribe, deepening the rift between disparate groups and undermining the idea of a Yemeni national identity. For instance, prior to 2004, Saleh used to support the Islah party against the Houthis and vice versa. Even during Yemen's 2011 uprising, Saleh endeavoured to fragment the anti-government protesters by arguing that the mixing of male and female protesters was un-Islamic.


In today's context, as the country engages in one of its bloodiest civil wars, there is a realignment taking place simultaneously on two levels: a reconfiguration of power and identities. Firstly, it is fuelled by the new reality where yesterday's adversaries are today's allies. After enduring six wars between 2004 and 2010 that led to the death of their founder-leader at the hands of Yemeni security forces under Saleh's rule, Houthis have formed an alliance with their old oppressor, Saleh.

Considering that Saleh used to be Saudis' ally in the fight against Houthis' revivalist movement for Zaydism through those six wars, today he is turning the tables, siding with Houthis not only to fight the Saudi-led coalition, but also to crush those who helped oust him in 2011. The reconfiguration of identity relations is perhaps the most troubling one - it shows itself as the violence on the ground has been mobilised based not on simple binary distinctions, but rather, on a complex and ambiguous process.

by Sam Kalda

While Yemen's biggest richness in diversity is its people and needs to be celebrated, in the light of the civil war, it has become the base of multifaceted local cleavages. For instance, in Houthi-owned media, there were reports on Houthi-Saleh militiamen calling the southerners "The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) supporters" to strip them of their "Yemeniness" in order to justify killing them. This has caused a great polarisation where southerners in Aden and Taiz mainly cheer for the Saudi-led air strikes against the Houthi forces, whereas people in Sanaa feel political allegiances based on ideological and class agenda.

Since Sanaa has become the headquarters of Houthi rule, locals point out that the capital city tends to exhibit animosity against the Saudi-led coalition and the south - not only because it's moving in line with Houthis' stance, but also because of the historical tensions between the north and the south.

The rise of the Houthi movement represents a major reconfiguration of identity politics in the country. As people are pushing themselves into a new formalised identity group, viewing what's at risk for them in the violence, they find it difficult to identify with others who used to be of like-minded groups. And yet, they engage - consciously and subconsciously - in a continuous process of negotiating differences and antagonisms at the social and political level. Thus, the concept of a "Yemeni nation" is being redefined. While the prospect of witnessing a comeback of two Yemen(s) is debatable, it's certain that the country's north will look completely different.

The longer the war drags on, the greater the polarisation.

One can argue that this has been the case since 2007, with the emergence of the secessionist movement - which by itself showed that no civil nationalist identity exists in Yemen. Still, I would argue that it's been the case since the unification in 1990, when a combination of nation-building and the integration of the north and the south has been nothing but a failure.The current realignment is more significant than the revolution itself in 2011, which only proposed a new desultory reality.
Yemen is being transformed through a drastic change, where Yemen's agencies in the private and political spheres are under transformation as well.


For my “Muwaledeen” family members across Yemen, they are still surviving and few of them had to flee back to Ethiopia, to the old home. “History repeats itself” tells me my cousin from Addis Ababa.

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*A brief version of this essay was originally published on Al Jazeera English.