Yemeni woman activist refuses to give up following death threats

A demonstration in Aden demanding "Justice for the prisoners and justice for the innocent"
with pictures of those detained held up (Image courtesy of Huda al-Sarari)

*Human rights lawyer Huda al-Sarari says she fears for her life after denouncing torture in secret prisons in Aden.

Huda al-Sarari was called a liar, a mercenary and even a “whore” on social media, during a vicious online campaign against the Yemeni human rights lawyer. Her ordeal began in June after she spoke out against torture in secret prisons allegedly run by the United Arab Emirates in Aden.

Sarari, who documented the abuses during an investigation and spoke about it to the media, said that her phone was stolen from her home, her car was attacked and she received death threats following the campaign. “I was afraid to leave my house or speak to media for more than a month,” Sarari told Middle East Eye. “But now, I want the word out, at least, about the dreadful experience [human rights activists have to] bear."

The defamation campaign against Sarari started in June on social media, after Human Rights Watch and the Associated Press published two separate investigations accusing the UAE of running secret prisons in Yemen, where many people were reportedly tortured and abused. She is one of the rights lawyers who documented the testimonies of torture victims held in the secret prisons and delivered them to HRW. She also gave interviews regarding her findings on several prominent media outlets after the reports came out.

HRW documented the cases of 49 people, including four children, who were arbitrarily detained or forcibly disappeared in the Aden and Hadramawt governates over the last year. At least 38 appear to have been arrested or detained by UAE-backed security forces. Multiple sources, including Yemeni government officials, have reported the existence of a number of informal detention centers and prisons in Aden and Hadramawt, including at least two run by the UAE and others run by UAE-backed Yemeni security forces.

The UAE Foreign Ministry denied running any secret prisons in Yemen and called the accusations "an attempt to sully the reputation of the alliance that had intervened to save the Yemeni people". The UAE is a key member of the Saudi-led and US-backed military campaign to support Yemen’s toppled government against Shia Houthi rebels, which was launched in March 2015. 

A protest in Aden demanding rights for prisoners (courtesy of Huda al-Sarari)

According to a draft United Nations report seen by Reuters on Thursday, the Saudi-led military coalition was responsible for an "unacceptably high" 51 percent of child deaths and injuries in Yemen last year. In January, the UN said that since the Saudi-led coalition intervened in 2015, the death toll has risen to at least 10,000 civilians.

One of the posts attacking Sarari stated that “the so-called Huda al-Sarari works in disguise with human rights groups, while she actually reports to political and security foreign parties, jeopardising [the] South’s interests and its goal for liberation." The Emergency Committee for Civil Society Organisations in Aden condemned the acts of defamation against Sarari and her family in a statement which spread on social media following the smear campaign. “The objective of this [campaign] is to reduce any efforts to defend human rights,” the statement said.

One day after the online attacks started on 23 June, Sarari and her family said they began to receive death threats. Sarari said that her phone was stolen from inside her home in Aden. Nothing else was taken from her house. The same day, her car windows were smashed. She added that her internet connection at home was deliberately cut off by an unknown person. Shortly after that, an acquaintance paid her a visit at her office to deliver her a "message" telling her that she should "be careful of your coming steps, otherwise you will risk your life", according to Sarari.




Family targeted

Sarari graduated in Sharia and Law from Aden University in 2011. She also holds a master's degree in Women's Studies and Development from the Women's Centre at Aden University.

She has been working in human rights activism for almost 10 years, gaining experience at numerous local organisations such as the Yemeni Women's Union, the Adala Foundation for Rights and Freedoms and the National Committee to Investigate Allegations of Human Rights Violations. She has also volunteered to work with Amnesty International and HRW.

With this experience, Sarari is accustomed to criticism. But this latest attack was something she has never experienced before. Sarari was disturbed by the posts, which she said were very personal and attacked her husband and children while identifying where they lived and even the car she drove. Her family was terrified when the social media campaign gained momentum. Huda’s mother, who preferred not to disclose her name, told MEE that, “if Huda is not fearful for her life, she must be fearful for the safety of her children," she said. "And because Huda is a woman, they go after her honour and this is unacceptable in our society.”


Sarari agrees that the worst part of the campaign launched against her is the libel and slander, which could bring shame to her whole family in the conservative society of Yemen. “As you may know, Yemen is a conservative society, in which women’s honour is perceived as sacred,” Sarari said. “Calling me degrading words like a whore has a stronger negative impact on me than it does if it were directed against a male activist.”

But others have also come to her defence. One Facebook post stated: "She said a word of truth against injustice, while you cheer for injustice, you who defame her honour should get whipped as a punishment according to our Sharia - that’s if there is any sharia in our land."

Human rights lawyer Huda al-Sarari working at the headquarters of the Yemeni Women's
Union in Aden (Photo courtesy of Huda al-Sarari)

"Quit your activism"

According to the HRW report, the court system in Aden is largely not functioning because of the war. Although the prosecutor’s office continues to issue release orders for people, these orders are ignored by security forces controlling the area. As a result, Sarari has found it futile to report threats against her to the prosecution and seek protection. "There is no chance to report threats today to the attorney general like we used to before, as it has been out of commission, impacted by the general instability," she said.

Aden is under the control of the Security Belt, a southern force taking part in the war. According to the HRW report issued in June, the "Security Belt" forces, are backed by the UAE. They have been accused of many abuses including excessive force during arrests and raids, detaining children, causing forcible disappearances and detaining family members of wanted suspects to pressure them to “voluntarily” turn themselves in, according to HRW. Sarari avoided approaching the "Security Belt" forces, given their links to the UAE. Instead, she contacted influential Yemeni political leaders.

"They couldn’t promise me much protection,” Sarari laughs and continues: “One [political leader] literally told me, 'how about you quit your activism and avoid facing risks?'”  For now, Sarari is taking basic safety measures such as limiting her movement, especially at night.

Kristine Beckerle, Yemen and UAE researcher at HRW told MEE: “Female activists like Huda al-Sarari are fighting every day for more rights protections, yet instead of addressing the important issues these [activists] are rising, many instead have faced smear campaigns, death threats, or a myriad of other challenges." "This is not only incredibly unfair to, and often very dangerous for, the women and men who have dedicated their lives to pushing for a more justice-oriented Yemen, but damaging to any future hope for a stable, rights-respecting state," she added.


According to local reports, there have been other instances where female activists have been subjected to similar online campaigns, like Radhya al-Mutawakel, who heads Mwatana, a human rights group based in Sanaa. In March, she was one of the speakers who addressed human rights violations in Yemen at the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington. She said that all parties in Yemen were committing human rights violations including the Houthi rebel group and the Saudi-led coalition.

The Yemeni embassy in Washington sent a letter trying to discourage congressional aides from attending the briefing in Washington. The embassy accused local speakers, including al-Mutawakel, of having a political “agenda” tied to Houthi rebels fighting against the government of President Abdu Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. The claim was denied by the event's organisers. Sarari said it was up to the main parties in the war, including the Yemeni government and the UAE, to restrain the armed groups and protect rights workers, especially women.

“I wish I had better advice for women activists in terms of how to protect themselves or could give clear answers on what human rights organisations could do to protect them," said Beckerle , "but, it really comes down to the authorities - to the Yemeni government and other actors like the UAE exercising influence over armed groups and fighting forces in Aden to be doing far more to ensure that there is space for men and women to speak out, advocate and do the work crucial to Yemen’s future."


'They depend on me'
Even though Sarari admits to being scared, she is determined to continue her work and has never considered quitting. Although it has been a difficult time for them, her family and husband offer their unconditional support and simply ask that she is careful. Part of Sarari’s many commitments are her assignments within the legal team of the Yemeni Women's Union. Its work includes offering legal protection for women in personal status cases and protecting the rights of female prisoners.

“Working with these women is like a driving force for me,” Sarari concluded. “Many abused women’s cases depend on me, so I have to ignore the threats and get up again and continue working.”

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*My latest article published at Middle East Eye, on 21st of August.

Realignment of Yemen's Identity Politics

Yemen in Sam Kalda's illustration

*As a blogger on Human Rights issues in Yemen for the past six years, I am stunned by the growing polarisation in the country; to take an even-handed stance for human rights is either viewed as treasonous act, or as a sectarian bias. If you criticise both the Saudi-led Arab coalition air strikes and the Houthi-Saleh alliance forces, the supporters of both camps accuse you of supporting one side over the other. It’s us or them, both sides maintain; no middle ground.

Throughout my activism, it was easy for me to remain in that middle ground due to my mixed Ethiopian-Yemeni background which influenced my strong faith in fundamental human rights for all people, regardless of their color of skin, ethnicity, gender, religious belief, etc. Having myself lived some of the ugly consequences of the abuse of human rights, in my case, that is racism, I developed a great sensibility of Yemen’s identity politics. Today, I perceive how people's definition of their identities in Yemen - whether in line with tribal, sectarian or class-based affinities - is realigning itself along with the new political order.

***

Growing up in Yemen, a country with a strict hierarchical class system was not an easy thing, especially for someone like myself with mixed-ethnic identity. My story, like the story of many multi-ethnic Yemenis, goes back to the time when my two Yemeni grandfathers, frustrated by the economic and political situation, had a leap of faith and left Yemen to find a better life elsewhere.

Yemeni ports served as a conduit for migration. Due geographic proximity, the African horn was the destination for many migration waves coming from Yemen. Going east was also a popular destination for southeastern Yemenis. For my northern grandfathers Ethiopia was the choice of destination. They settled and married two Ethiopian ladies (my grandmothers) and had children (among them are my later-to-be my parents). It is estimated that there were 300,000 - 400,000 Yemenis in Ethiopia at that time. Following the revolution of 1962 in north of Yemen, the revolution of 1963 in its South and the dictatorship of Mengistu in their host country, many Yemeni migrants, including my grandparents, decided to go back to their home country in the 1970s. Some were forced to go back to Yemen by the emergence of communism in Ethiopia and its nationalisation policies that ripped them off the little wealth they worked hard to create, yet some were lured by the political change that had taken place at home. With a revolutionary perspective, Yemen’s former president, the late Ibrahim Al Hamdi was a key figure in calling on Yemenis abroad to return as he embarked on the road of nation building. Thus, my Yemeni-Ethiopian parents migrated back to Yemen.

by Sam Kalda

In Yemen’s class system, unlike the “Akhdam”, a degrading term used to describe a dark-skinned minority who are believed to be the descendants of Ethiopian invaders from the sixth century and who has been enduring a history of discrimination, I found myself located at the “Muwaladeen” categorisation, a term used to describe Yemenis born to foreign parents; the term was meant to racify the “half-Yemeni”, thus I struggled with both an identity crisis and racism. The most problematic issue though was the interplay between racism and classism. Growing up in Sana’a where at school I had my first encounter with Yemen’s multiplex social structure, my classmates bragged about their different classes; such as, Qadi and Hashemite class. As a kid, I was most intrigued and struck by the latter.

Hashemite class claims direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, and many Hashemites see the superiority of their class above all outside their clan, and there has been a widespread concern among Yemenis that members of the Hashemite class, alongside with the Houthi movement, are fostering visions of restoring a religious imamite and resuming hierarchical supremacy. Families belonging to this lineage composes a form of nobility in Yemen, with many of them marrying only within their class. North-Yemen, once ruled by zaidi hashemite dynasties from the very same north where Houthis come from, was freed from their reign by a coup d’etat in 1962 against the last Imam, Mohammed Al Badr Bin Hamidaddin, establishing the Yemen Arab Republic. This resulted in a civil war between the royalists and the republicans which lasted until the end of the sixties.


In today’s context, it’s crucial to remember that the Imam used to be the supreme representative of the Shia Zaidi Hashemite class, ruling north of Yemen in their name; much like how the Houthi movement is currently claiming to represent the Shia Zaidis. The main concern now is whether the reign of the Houthis would reproduce the old hierarchical class system, from which Yemen has not been fully liberated in its fifty years of the republic.


Being part of two cultures, two settings and two forms of being problematised Yemen’s identity politics for me and my hybridity forced a rift between me and home. Nonetheless, it provided me with a critical outlook of political and social issues. Even more intensely today, as I live abroad, the vision I have towards Yemen is a vision of plurality. Thus, my Human Rights activism as a blogger since 2011 has been modeled by my belief in a Yemen that guarantees its citizens a social structure where they can live in with their cultural complexities and diverse identities & ethnicities that have been historically shaped by the decisions Yemenis have made.

***

Yemen in Sam Kalda's illustration

Although Yemen's complex political, social and cultural structures have managed to function as a fluid equilibrium on the surface, there have always been chronic identity tensions.

Until Yemen's 2011 uprising, these identity tensions were influenced by two major factors: the unification in 1990 and the aftermath of the civil war in 1994, resulting in major rifts between north and south. Some contend that one of the causes of the tensions was former President Ali Abdullah Saleh's forced seizure of the lands in the south, leading to discontent among southerners over his rule.

Another likely cause was when southerners realised that the new oil finds in the south that formed more than 40 percent of Yemen's reserves back then would have supported South Yemen's smaller population if they had not been seized by the north. Furthermore, during my personal observations in the country, there was a feeling in South Yemen, particularly among "de-tribalised" people, who felt that they should (re-)define themselves as tribes to be taken seriously by the new ruling system in the north.

Saleh's approach to leadership further complicated identity relations. His leadership was based on divide and rule and his tactics on prioritising the survival and benefit of his own family and tribe, deepening the rift between disparate groups and undermining the idea of a Yemeni national identity. For instance, prior to 2004, Saleh used to support the Islah party against the Houthis and vice versa. Even during Yemen's 2011 uprising, Saleh endeavoured to fragment the anti-government protesters by arguing that the mixing of male and female protesters was un-Islamic.


In today's context, as the country engages in one of its bloodiest civil wars, there is a realignment taking place simultaneously on two levels: a reconfiguration of power and identities. Firstly, it is fuelled by the new reality where yesterday's adversaries are today's allies. After enduring six wars between 2004 and 2010 that led to the death of their founder-leader at the hands of Yemeni security forces under Saleh's rule, Houthis have formed an alliance with their old oppressor, Saleh.

Considering that Saleh used to be Saudis' ally in the fight against Houthis' revivalist movement for Zaydism through those six wars, today he is turning the tables, siding with Houthis not only to fight the Saudi-led coalition, but also to crush those who helped oust him in 2011. The reconfiguration of identity relations is perhaps the most troubling one - it shows itself as the violence on the ground has been mobilised based not on simple binary distinctions, but rather, on a complex and ambiguous process.

by Sam Kalda

While Yemen's biggest richness in diversity is its people and needs to be celebrated, in the light of the civil war, it has become the base of multifaceted local cleavages. For instance, in Houthi-owned media, there were reports on Houthi-Saleh militiamen calling the southerners "The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) supporters" to strip them of their "Yemeniness" in order to justify killing them. This has caused a great polarisation where southerners in Aden and Taiz mainly cheer for the Saudi-led air strikes against the Houthi forces, whereas people in Sanaa feel political allegiances based on ideological and class agenda.

Since Sanaa has become the headquarters of Houthi rule, locals point out that the capital city tends to exhibit animosity against the Saudi-led coalition and the south - not only because it's moving in line with Houthis' stance, but also because of the historical tensions between the north and the south.

The rise of the Houthi movement represents a major reconfiguration of identity politics in the country. As people are pushing themselves into a new formalised identity group, viewing what's at risk for them in the violence, they find it difficult to identify with others who used to be of like-minded groups. And yet, they engage - consciously and subconsciously - in a continuous process of negotiating differences and antagonisms at the social and political level. Thus, the concept of a "Yemeni nation" is being redefined. While the prospect of witnessing a comeback of two Yemen(s) is debatable, it's certain that the country's north will look completely different.

The longer the war drags on, the greater the polarisation.

One can argue that this has been the case since 2007, with the emergence of the secessionist movement - which by itself showed that no civil nationalist identity exists in Yemen. Still, I would argue that it's been the case since the unification in 1990, when a combination of nation-building and the integration of the north and the south has been nothing but a failure.The current realignment is more significant than the revolution itself in 2011, which only proposed a new desultory reality.
Yemen is being transformed through a drastic change, where Yemen's agencies in the private and political spheres are under transformation as well.


For my “Muwaledeen” family members across Yemen, they are still surviving and few of them had to flee back to Ethiopia, to the old home. “History repeats itself” tells me my cousin from Addis Ababa.

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*A brief version of this essay was originally published on Al Jazeera English.